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Up until around 2008 and the subsequent revelation of systematic 
manipulation, the integrity and ‘facticity’ of the London Interbank Offered 
Rate (LIBOR) were rarely questioned. Academics treated LIBOR and the 
Eurodollar market as if they were synonyms. Central bankers conducted 
monetary policy as if the LIBOR was an objective reflection of the money 
market rate. Corporates and households entered into LIBOR-indexed 
financial contacts as if a money market was the underlying benchmark. This 
paper investigates how and why LIBOR managed to maintain its status as a 
term for the competitive money market colloquially, professionally and in 
the economic literature for so long. By adopting a theoretical framework 
drawing insights from both political economy and sociology, and applying 
it to the LIBOR-indexed derivatives market, it is shown how the 
benchmark’s appearance betrays its fundamental nature. This process 
benefits certain actors within the market: the banks. Importantly, however, 
it also reveals how LIBOR became, and remained, such an important 
benchmark, how it came to be perceived as an ‘objective fact’, and why the 
regulation that came into place was insufficient to sustain its future use. 
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Introduction 
 
On 27 July 2017, Andrew Bailey, Chief Executive of the UK Financial Conduct Authority 
surprisingly announced that the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) would cease to 
exist in 2021.3 Having become a regulated financial benchmark in the aftermath of the 
‘LIBOR-scandal’ that erupted in 2012, the supervisor had come to the conclusion that ‘the 
underlying market that LIBOR seeks to measure – the market for unsecured term lending to 
banks – is no longer sufficiently active’ (FCA 2017). In essence, the regulator found that it 
was unsustainable to support the process of generating a price that simply was ‘made up’.  
The making of LIBOR, sometimes coined ‘the world’s most important number’, 
provides a remarkable history lesson in contemporary finance (Finch and Vaughan 2017; 
Stenfors 2017). However, the gradual, and now final, ‘unmaking’ of it also provides crucial 
insights into how benchmarks could be conceptualised in economic and social theory. Indeed, 
prior to the LIBOR scandal, benchmarks in financial markets were seldom mentioned as 
more than footnotes in academic literature, or for that matter by the financial press or 
regulators – despite their prevalence and importance. In many ways, this is not surprising. 
After all, benchmarks are used as standardised indicators for measuring and analysing 
performance and predictions for the future of something else. Just as the consumer price 
index (CPI) is a measure of inflation in economics, the FTSE100 and S&P500 are useful 
benchmarks for studying the U.K. and U.S. stock markets in finance. ‘Inflation’ and ‘the U.S. 
stock market’ are common knowledge. Extremely few, however, know the precise 
composition or methodology underpinning the CPI or the S&P500.  
The discovery that LIBOR, at times, had been subject to manipulation by banks 
immediately put the integrity of the arguably most important benchmark in economics and 
finance into question. LIBOR-indexed derivatives portfolios, and the desire to signal a 
relatively low funding cost to the rest of the market, appear to have given some banks 
sufficiently strong incentives to submit deceptive LIBOR quotes in order to reap monetary 
benefits from having the exclusive privilege to participate in the LIBOR fixing process (see, 
for instance, Financial Services Agency 2011; FSA 2012). Understandably, therefore, the 
benchmark literature has since almost become synonymous with market misconduct, 
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manipulation and regulation (e.g. Abrantes-Metz et al. 2012; Stenfors 2014ab; Ashton and 
Christophers 2015; Duffie and Stein 2015). 
However, by being deeply rooted in the financial system as a whole, the relevance of 
LIBOR4 or its equivalent elsewhere (such as EURIBOR, TIBOR and so on) as an important 
‘price’ outside the realm of the trading floors can hardly be understated. Benchmarks 
referencing interest rates affect not only central banks, banks and other financial institutions, 
but also corporates, investors and households. According to the Bank for International 
Settlements, the notional amount of outstanding over-the-counter (OTC) interest rate 
derivatives contracts amounted to 544 trillion U.S. dollars in June 2016 (BIS 2016a). Of 
these, it estimated that that between 60% and 90% are linked to the LIBOR, EURIBOR or 
TIBOR. For the vast exchange-traded futures and options market, the corresponding 
percentages lie between 90% and 100%, depending on the currency (FEMR 2014). However, 
LIBOR is not only used in derivatives, but also in mortgages, bonds, corporate and student 
loan contacts - as well as in valuation methods relating to accounting, tax, risk and monetary 
policy.  
Acknowledging the importance of LIBOR (and the structure and events enabling the 
scandal to unfold), the subsequent benchmark reforms were thus underpinned by principles 
such as ‘professionalism’, ‘correctness’ and ‘formalisation’. Overall, the measures strived to 
eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, the incentives of benchmark manipulation. The reforms 
were neither intended to make the underlying market more transparent, nor to make LIBOR 
based upon market transactions. Instead, provisions such as the use of ‘expert judgment’ were 
supposed to address periods when the underlying market was not sufficiently active.  
Ultimately, and paradoxically before the new European benchmark legislation was to 
fully apply from 1 January 2018 (ESMA 2017), LIBOR was found to be unsustainable as a 
benchmark due to a lack of activity in the underlying market. It would be tempting to 
attribute this realisation either to the greater scrutiny imposed upon banks, and dialogues with 
regulators, following the scandal or to the general demise of unsecured money markets 
following the credit crunch a decade ago.  
However, such an approach would fail to address several important theoretical 
questions relating to why the integrity and ‘facticity’ of LIBOR remain intact from its 
inception in 1986 up until the financial crisis of 2007-08. As Stenfors (2014a, 392) points out, 
                                                
4 Other LIBOR-equivalent benchmarks, such as the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) and the Tokyo 
Interbank Offered Rate (TIBOR), have also come under regulatory scrutiny. In this paper, we generally refer to 
LIBOR as encompassing all ‘LIBOR-equivalent’ benchmarks. 
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‘academics treated the terms [LIBOR and money market] as if they were synonyms. 
Policymakers acted as if the LIBOR was an objective reflection of the money market rate. 
Corporates and households entered into LIBOR-indexed financial contacts as if the money 
market was the underlying benchmark’. Consequently, and regardless of what the future 
holds, questions remain how and why LIBOR achieved, and maintained for so long, its status 
as a term for the competitive Eurodollar market colloquially, professionally and in the 
economic literature. Or, if seen through the lens of the LIBOR scandal: how and why was 
deception seen as unthinkable for more than two decades, only to change so quickly once the 
scandal broke? Or, when looking towards 2021 and beyond: how and why were the 
regulatory reforms destined to fail? 
We argue that to understand the making, and unmaking, of LIBOR, it is critical to 
understand the ways in which its appearance creates misconceptions about its fundamental or 
essential nature. To do this, we trace the changing historical and social conditions, which 
gave rise to its emergence and development. We make use of the following approach to 
reveal the underlying logic of these developments. Marx (1852) wrote: ‘Men make their own 
history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected 
circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the 
past’. A study of the emergence and development of LIBOR clearly shows this pattern of 
agency within an inherited structure, which, in turn, alters the structure, leading to fresh 
incentives for agents. The structure within which agents act is, of course, a social construct, 
established through the widespread adoption of certain practices which once entrenched take 
on an objective appearance (and which Ilyenkov (2012) labelled an ‘ideal’). This apparently 
objective structure, such as the existence of the Eurodollar market, or LIBOR, interacts with 
the motivations of agents, here above all economic or profit motivations, to establish new 
practices, and hence structures for further practices.  
Given a complex and multi-causal world, it would be impossible to predict how such 
behaviour could develop in the future. It would, for instance, have been impossible during the 
1960s to extrapolate from the development of the Eurodollar market to the almost 
incomprehensibly large amount of outstanding LIBOR-indexed derivatives half a century 
later. Nevertheless, with the benefit of hindsight, we can develop a logical path from the 
emergence of the Eurodollar market to the LIBOR scandal and beyond by showing how new 
practices developed in these financial markets, which shaped future behaviour.  
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In doing so, we must take into account the power relations involved. Established 
practices, ideals, and social structures incorporate the power involved in the relations which 
underpin them (albeit that they do so via mediations which may sometimes produce 
unexpected outcomes). In the case of LIBOR, it is above all the largest banks that could and 
did act to make (and unmake) LIBOR. They did so primarily by trying to exploit profit-
making opportunities that were thrown up along the way, from syndicated loans, to 
Eurodollar futures, to OTC swaps. Their pursuit of profit opportunities at each turn changed 
the shape of financial markets, throwing up new opportunities for the banks themselves, and 
below we move through analysis from one stage to another tracing this evolution. They do so 
above all with the transactions they undertake and their power to do so – by creating 
favourable conventions, by seeking to avoid regulation and transparency, by lobbying for 
status quo and by shaping perceptions held by others.   
The LIBOR scandal has undoubtedly shaken the social structure of the LIBOR panel 
banks to its core. However, the widespread misconduct and the subsequent vast number of 
transcripts of evidence released by the regulators do not, in themselves, reveal the evolution 
of the “consensus of views held by the body of these individuals as to what is right, good, 
expedient […]” (Veblen 1899, 90). In this study, we see that both markets and benchmarks 
emerge, shape agents’ actions and are in turn dramatically altered by new practices that 
develop. For example, we see the Eurodollar markets emerge, give rise to LIBOR and 
become eclipsed by it. However, in order to understand what we mean by categories such as 
‘markets’ we need to understand who participates in them, and who took what actions (and 
with which motivations) to establish them. In the case of LIBOR, we can trace the 
motivations for banks to establish the Eurodollar market, why interest rate benchmarks 
emerged and why banks went on to develop those benchmarks at the centre of the derivatives 
markets which developed so rapidly from the late 1980s onwards.  
This approach provides new insights into the rise, importance and seeming solidity of 
LIBOR. The method draws on Marxist political economy, particularly the idea of relations 
solidifying as objects, and of established practices becoming ‘ideals’ (Ilyenkov 2012). 
However, as Lindo (2017) points out, those examining derivatives with a broadly Marxist 
frame have generally examined their role in the broader developments of capitalism (e.g. 
LiPuma and Lee 2005; Bryan and Rafferty 2006; Wigan 2008, 2009) as have other heterodox 
economists, notably Toporowski. (2000). What is required in this paper, setting it apart from 
these studies, is a political economy of financial mechanisms, a look inside financial markets 
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and inside banks, and here we must draw on social science more generally and in particular 
the social studies of finance. Economic sociologists have undertaken close study of the 
relations in these markets and have a considerable advantage over the majority of economists 
in that the researchers have visited trading floors (e.g. Beunza and Stark 2004; Godechot 
2008), interviewed traders and bankers (e.g. MacKenzie and Millo 2003) and base their 
findings on close study of the markets at work (e.g. Knorr-Cetina and Preda 2005), including 
examining benchmarks (MacKenzie 2008). To this, we add our combined experience of more 
than 25 years working in financial markets and in interest rate derivatives in particular. By 
marrying the conceptual framework of political economy with the detailed insights of social 
science and our own experience, we are able to offer fresh insights.  
In sum, we investigate and demonstrate how the appearance of the benchmark differs 
from its fundamental nature. This process is shown to benefit certain actors within the 
market: the banks. Importantly, the process also reveals and answers our research question: 
namely how and why LIBOR became, and remained such an important benchmark and how 
it came to be perceived as an ‘objective fact’. 
 
A Theory of Financial Benchmarks 
 
The key empirical fact when investigating the rise of LIBOR is that its rise to prominence 
was via derivatives markets. It follows that theory which seeks to explain the rise of 
benchmarks must also pay attention to derivatives and the extraordinary changes they have 
undergone, and wrought, since the late 1980s.  
According to the UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as amended by the 
Financial Services Act 2012, a benchmark is defined as an ‘index, rate or price that is 
determined from time to time by reference to the state of the market; is made available to the 
public (whether free of charge or on payment); and is used for reference for purposes that 
include one or more of the following: i) determining the interest payable, or other sums due, 
under loan agreements or other contracts relating to investments; ii) determining the price at 
which investments may be bought or sold or the value of investments; iii) measuring the 
performance of investments’ (FEMR 2014, 4).  
Although this definition might not be complete it is sufficient to indicate the key 
elements of the role benchmarks play in derivatives markets. First, the benchmark is related 
to but separate and distinct from the objects determining it. Second, it is a measurement and 
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as such cannot be bought or sold, it cannot be delivered in exchange for money; it can, 
however, determine sums due in other financial instruments. In derivatives markets, 
therefore, it acts as a ‘bridge’ between the underlying market and the derivative markets, both 
relating the derivative to the underlying, but critically, and this is the point most often missed 
by economic theories of derivatives, separating the derivative from the underlying.  
Prior to the 1980s the best-known and most-traded derivatives markets were the 
agricultural commodities markets of North America, which were characterised by exchange-
traded and physically-settled derivatives. Textbook accounts of derivatives often look back to 
these forms as typical and perhaps because of this they treat derivatives as a way of trading 
an underlying commodity. This approach has its roots in neoclassical economics and the 
allocational efficiency of complete markets, most famously laid out by Arrow & Debreu 
(1954). According to this theory, being able to transact in the future reduces uncertainty and 
thereby increases the utility of risk-averse derivatives users (Copeland and Weston 1988). 
Derivatives are explained as a cheaper form of the primitive securities that feature in standard 
accounts of efficient markets (Ross 1976). Thus, derivatives are treated as a way to trade an 
underlying commodity. In fact, neoclassical economic theory starts by assuming that selling 
commodities and selling via a derivative are synonymous. However, while the similarities 
between the two are important, it is the differences that reveal more about the nature of 
derivatives, and lead to our investigation into why the benchmark is completely ‘left out’ 
from the analysis.  
First, if derivatives are synonymous with the underlying how can we explain their 
existence, let alone the incredible size of derivatives markets? Second, how can we explain 
what changed in the late 1980s and early 1990s which led to such incredible growth? Perhaps 
the major change is the advent of cash-settlement. During the expansion of trading since the 
1980s the vast majority of derivatives trades are cash-settled, either because only cash 
settlement is permitted under the terms of the derivatives contract, or because contracts 
permitting physical settlement are overwhelmingly closed out or settled for cash prior to 
settlement. Theory, therefore, should approach cash-settlement as typical and physically 
settled as an earlier form that has been eclipsed. Cash-settled derivatives proceed as if an 
underlying commodity-like exchange occurs: they appear to represent the net cash payment 
that would occur if an underlying purchase and sale have been completed. As happens so 
often, though, appearance is the inverse of reality, for cash settlement specifically ensures 
that no underlying exchange occurs. Only cash is delivered, and no commodity, security or 
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any other asset is involved. One side of the bridge, therefore, is the relation and separation 
between derivative and benchmark. 
Turning to the other side of the bridge and the relation between the benchmark and 
the underlying, a fundamental issue with LIBOR is the discrepancy between what LIBOR is 
and what it has been perceived to be. It is a benchmark, but has been perceived to be the 
Eurodollar market, the international money market, the short-term interbank money market or 
an objective reflection thereof. Indeed, derivatives offer an insight into why the benchmark 
cannot be synonymous with the underlying market. By definition, a derivative instrument is 
not the same as the underlying asset, index or measurement – otherwise it would not warrant 
a different name. A derivative contract allows counterparties to transact as if they have 
bought or sold an underlying without actually having done so. Even in commodity derivatives 
(so often used in standard textbooks to explain derivatives) what is bought and sold is not the 
specific and produce of a particular farmer, but rather a standard quantity of a standard 
quality of a commodity, as MacKenzie (2006) shows. Should a farmer’s produce not meet the 
quantity or quality requirements of the derivative, the selling famer would need to source the 
relevant goods elsewhere for delivery into the derivative. Alternatively, when buying a 
derivative on the S&P500 the derivative trader is not interested in buying and selling 500 
stocks. The benchmark abstracts from the particular of that which it represents, and the 
underlying to a derivative can, therefore, be seen as a ‘homogeneous abstraction’, with a 
degree of separation from the underlying. (Cronon 1991, 132, quoted in MacKenzie 2006, 
14). 
Arnoldi (2004, 24) states, ‘When something comes to exist “in practice”, but not in 
reality in the strict sense, it can be said to be virtual’. In this sense derivatives dealers (i.e. 
banks) must invest in the ‘the material production of virtuality’ (MacKenzie 2007); they must 
bring into being something to trade in practice but not in reality. Economic sociologists have 
explored the material ways in which the virtual nature of financial markets comes into being 
in general and how the virtual asset underlying the derivative is ‘made’ in particular. By 
investigating how the LIBOR was created by banks in order to be able to trade the two most 
common types of derivatives (Eurodollar futures and interest rate swaps), or variants of these, 
we can show how the derivate instrument becomes separated from the underlying itself, 
namely the lending and borrowing of money in the Eurodollar market.  
In a Eurodollar futures contract, the as if underlying is a 3-month U.S. dollar deposit 
of one million. This means that the underlying price index is an interest rate corresponding to 
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such a deposit, in other words, the 3-month U.S. dollar LIBOR. The counterparties involved 
exchange the equivalent of the change in the rate of interest on a 3-month U.S. dollar deposit 
of one million. Although no actual deposit is made or required, for each contract they 
exchange as if they had the deposit. On an exchange where futures are traded (such as the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange), margin procedures mean that the exchange steps between the 
two counterparties and payments are made every day to or from the exchange reflecting the 
movements in LIBOR. OTC derivative contracts, such as interest rate swaps and forward rate 
agreements, escaped exchanges with the claim to be bespoke contracts but have steadily 
standardised and the large majority are collateralised daily in a manner akin to margin calls at 
exchanges. An interest rate swap appears as if one party pays a fixed interest rate and the 
other party pays a floating rate. The underlying price index of the floating interest rate is 
generally LIBOR. The original conception of an interest rate swap, however, is of 
counterparties trading as if undertaking a string of forward-starting Eurodollar deposits. 
For a lender, extending a loan has two principal disadvantages. First, there is a risk 
that the principal and interest will not be paid back (credit risk). Second, there is a need to 
fund such a loan (liquidity risk). These act as a restriction on the amount lent. Trading a 
derivative on the relevant interest rate as if the loan has been made also involves both 
funding/liquidity risk and credit risk - but greatly diminished compared to the loan itself as it 
is only on the change in value rather than the full notional amount. Furthermore, the 
infrastructure of the market, ranging from standardised ISDA (International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association) agreements to exchange margining, acts to reduce these costs. 
Derivatives, therefore, remove an implicit restriction in the underlying market and allow 
trading for price change on a greatly enlarged scale - both through larger contracts and more 
frequent transacting. Note, however, that if one wants to borrow or lend money, the 
derivative is not the logical place to do so. The derivative serves only to capture the price 
change as if lending occurred.  
Herein lies the fundamental separation between trading the real underlying asset and 
trading with a derivative: in the former, an asset or commodity is exchanged for money, in 
the second the underlying is a measurement. It is impossible to actually exchange a 
measurement, it is only possible to trade derivatives on it. This has two important 
consequences. First, it makes derivatives useless for those that want to exchange the 
underlying but perfect for, and restricts users to, those that want to capture price changes in 
the underlying benchmark through buying and selling. Second, the fundamental separation 
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enables a vast expansion of the quantities that can be traded and of the things that can be 
traded, by removing the need to source and deliver the underlying asset, instead what is 
required for trading is an agreed upon measurement or benchmark. This is true whether the 
asset is an agricultural commodity or, as explored above, a Eurodollar deposit. The 
characteristic of derivatives that stems from this examination of the underlying price index is 
most evident in the most developed forms of derivatives, such as weather derivatives for 
which delivery of an underlying asset is simply impossible (there is no asset in this case). In 
other words, the outstanding amount of corn derivatives need not be related to the size of the 
global harvest, for example and nor does the amount of LIBOR-derivatives need to be related 
to the amount of total assets in the global banking system. This enables the LIBOR-
derivatives market to eclipse the Eurodollar market, and for LIBOR to replace the latter as an 
objective fact and be put into wider use throughout the economy.  
 
Making Markets 
 
Having briefly discussed our method and some theoretical considerations of derivatives and 
benchmarks, this section begins the more detailed logical and historical investigation into the 
emergence of the underlying Eurodollar markets, the LIBOR benchmark, and the derivatives 
markets that made LIBOR so critical.  
 
The Eurodollar Market: Made by Banks for Banks 
 
The Eurodollar market played a central role in the forthcoming transformation and 
deregulation of finance (Lapavitsas 2009). Its actual birth is set in 1957, when banks created 
a market in Europe where U.S. dollar deposits were re-lent to European institutions instead of 
re-invested in the United States. Eurodollars hereby came to be defined as deposits 
denominated in U.S. dollars at banks outside the U.S. As these kinds of deposits later came to 
be denominated in other currencies, these Eurocurrencies in general (Eurodeutschmarks, 
Euroyen, Eurosterling and so on) came to represent borrowing and lending outside of the 
jurisdiction of the central bank issuing the denominated currency.  
The Eurocurrency market grew fast, from around 14 billion U.S. dollars in 1964 to 
over 2,500 billion in 1988 (Sarver 1990), mirroring increasing international trade and 
investment after the Second World War. U.S. multinational corporations in Europe, in 
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particular, sought cheaper, alternative ways to fund their foreign expansion. There was 
demand for new funding alternatives, and compared to the U.S. domestic interest rate 
markets, Eurodollars offered tighter bid-offer spreads and generally lower rates as a result of 
less regulation, lower administrative costs, larger economies of scale and less credit risk. The 
new market was also boosted by structural economic factors, such as the U.S. balance of 
payments deficit after the Marshall Plan and a growing pool of U.S. dollars abroad as central 
banks had accumulated large currency reserves during and after the Bretton Woods 
framework. Overall, the Eurodollar market proved to be of a special character; it became 
systematic; had a clear purpose; and also, after some resistance, became approved by the 
authorities. Fundamentally, it resulted in a growing and lasting organised international money 
market.  
The first Eurodollar trade seems to have been triggered by fears of sovereign and 
political risk, as the international political climate that existed during the Cold War began to 
intensify towards the late 1950s (Higonnet 1985). However, an important driver of the 
Eurodollar market was regulation, or more specifically: the banks’ determination to avoid it 
(U.S. markets, in particular, were heavily regulated at the time). The subsequent ‘competitive 
deregulation’ process on both sides of the Atlantic in well covered in the literature. In 
neoclassical economic theory, the Eurodollar market has since generally been seen as an 
example of how well the market works when free from government regulation (Porter 2005). 
In a free, global market economy, which is seen to be more efficient than a regulated one, 
innovations such as the Eurodollar market that competitively aims to exploit inefficiencies 
(through, for instance, regulatory arbitrage) are normal developments. It is also economically 
beneficial, and governments thus have the opportunity to speed up the process through 
deregulation and thereby further facilitate innovation and the globalisation of finance. 
Within International Political Economy (Helleiner 1994; Strange 1986, 1996), 
however, the Eurodollar market has often been used as an analogy to depict the increasing 
powers of the self-regulated international financial market vis-à-vis states during the recent 
decades. Empirical evidence demonstrating the spread of ‘Casino Capitalism’ is usually 
found in the seemingly liquid and efficient foreign exchange, money and derivatives markets.  
Neo-Gramscians (Cox 1987; Gill and Law 1989), on the other hand, tend to focus on 
internationally mobile financial capital. Financial capital, it is argued, can react to 
government policies or expected policies much more rapidly than productive capital, thereby 
forcing governments to adopt certain policies that are suitable for finance. Within this 
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framework, capital strives for the best conditions to survive and prosper, and nation-states 
compete to attract capital. Consequently, there is a dialectic relationship between the nature 
and scope of markets on one hand, and the forms of state intervention and regulation on the 
other. The rapidly growing and globally more integrated capital markets, the birth of the 
Eurodollar market, along with technology and communications, led to international mobile 
capital gaining more structural power. 
Explanations for the birth and rapid growth of the Eurodollar market can be found in a 
range of macroeconomic, political and regulatory factors. However, despite the fact that the 
Eurodollar market continued to grow, the role of it gradually tended to become ignored, or at 
least downplayed. Instead, focus is put on the processes of liberalisation, deregulation, 
globalisation and financialisation from the 1980s in order to explain the development of the 
financial derivatives market and the rise of finance more generally (see, for instance, Epstein 
2005; Orhangazi 2008).  
We argue that this approach leads to a false precision, as the Eurodollar market 
preceded the subsequent financialisation process and was pivotal in prompting the 
deregulation process. By emphasising the importance of Eurodollar market as a key historical 
event, important actors emerge that would otherwise easily be overlooked: the banks. As 
MacKenzie (2007) states, markets do not simply evolve. Markets are invented and made. The 
Eurodollar market did not emerge automatically and autonomously within the existing money 
market. It was made by banks. 
 
LIBOR: Made by Banks for Banks 
 
The rate at which Eurodollars (or Eurocurrencies) were trading became known as the 
Eurodollar rate. This Eurodollar rate was not ‘official’, but for syndicated loans an average 
was instead taken from three reference banks at 11 a.m. two days before the rollover date. 
With time members of large loan syndicates became increasingly insistent that the reference 
bank chosen be representative in borrowing strength to the various bank syndicate members. 
Also, the syndicates sometimes tried to retain the right to name substitute reference banks if 
the requisite majority of syndicate members felt that the original reference bank had lower 
borrowing costs than would be representative for the syndicate as a whole (Sarver 1990). As 
a result, in 1984, U.K. banks asked the British Bankers Association (BBA) to develop a 
calculation method (or ‘fixing mechanism’) that could be used as an impartial basis for 
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calculating interest on syndicated loans. This led to the creation of ‘BBAIRS’, the BBA 
Interest Rate Settlement in 1985, which in 1986 became LIBOR. Thus, LIBOR did not 
evolve automatically from the Eurodollar market. It was made by banks. 
Originally designed using the tradable Eurocurrency market as a template, LIBOR 
bears a close resemblance to a market. The LIBOR panel banks are in effect a list of the 
largest banks in the world that are competing fiercely against each other. However, LIBOR 
was never an outcome of a market-determined process. Instead, individual banks are asked, 
without being able to see each other’s quotes, to submit their rates according to the following 
criteria: ‘At what rate could you borrow funds, where you to do so by asking for and then 
accepting interbank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?’ (IBA 2014, 12). 
The submitted quotes from the individual panel banks are then collected by an independent 
calculation agent and ‘trimmed’, whereby a proportion of the highest and lowest quotes is 
omitted. Finally, the average is calculated and made public (BBA 2012). Thus, the submitted 
quotes are not binding, tradable prices. Instead, LIBOR (and its equivalents elsewhere) can be 
seen as benchmarks for where the selected panel banks argue the money market is. More 
specifically, each individually submitted quote is supposed to represent where the LIBOR-
bank claims to be able to borrow funds (ibid), where the CIBOR5-bank argues it would be 
prepared to lend funds (Finansraadet 2011), or where the EURIBOR-bank estimates others to 
be able to do so (EBF 2012a). 
The LIBOR panel compositions have slowly changed over time, mainly as a result of 
bank mergers, and now generally include large universal banks that are highly active - and 
normally market-makers - in the money, foreign exchange and derivatives markets. Likewise, 
despite the differences in size (ranging from just five members in the STIBOR6 panel to 43 in 
the EURIBOR panel) they have also tended to increasingly include international banks that 
are not under the direct jurisdiction of the central bank issuing the underlying currency for 
that particular benchmark. In other words, they are either typical too-big-to-fail banks for the 
domestic banking system, or ‘global systematically important banks’ – with, for instance, 14 
out of the 18 U.S. dollar LIBOR panel members belonging to the latter group  (BBA 2013; 
FSB 2011). Formal ‘membership’ in a LIBOR panel has always been very difficult to obtain, 
as the formal selection criteria per definition not only exclude non-bank financial institutions, 
but implicitly also the vast majority of smaller and medium-size banks. Most institutions are 
                                                
5 Copenhagen Interbank Offered Rate 
6 Stockholm Interbank Offered Rate 
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already disqualified upon application by requirements such as branch presence, market 
making ability, sizeable trading activity and reputation (BBA 2013; EBF 2012b; FNO 2011; 
JBA 2012).  
As discussed in the previous section, the Eurodollar market prompted regulatory 
arbitrage between different jurisdictions, which resulted in a competitive deregulation process 
among states. Likewise, LIBOR (with its roots in the Eurodollar market) managed to escape 
the confinements of particular regulatory jurisdictions. Thus, up until 20137, the benchmark 
was unregulated. However, it was not self-regulated by the ‘wider market’ either. Rather, it 
was governed by the groups of LIBOR panel banks themselves, and generally overseen by a 
bank lobby organisation (such as the British Bankers Association). Therefore, LIBOR was 
‘protected’ by the LIBOR panels themselves, or associations working for these. It should not 
come as a surprise that the lobby organisations often acted as defendants on behalf of the 
banks regarding the integrity of the LIBOR fixing mechanism, despite pressure from other 
market participants (see, for instance, ACI 2008ab).  
The fundamental institutions, such as the definition, the fixing mechanism or the 
panel bank compositions of the LIBOR benchmarks remained remarkably unchanged, despite 
far-reaching changes in financial markets more generally from the 1980s. This status quo (in 
other words maintaining control over the underlying benchmark, whilst keeping its integrity 
intact) undoubtedly suited banks’ interests.  
The Eurocurrency market had, by definition, an international component and therefore 
a natural link to foreign exchange through the covered interest rate parity8. As the market 
grew, so did the foreign exchange market closely linked to it. Spin-offs, such as Eurodollar 
certificates of deposit, Eurobonds and syndicated Eurocredit markets enabled the 
international banking community to extend credits beyond the prudential and legal lending 
limits of individual banks. In this context, the Eurodollar market played a central role in the 
transformation of the money and credit markets and the international financial system and as 
a whole. Syndicated loans, as mentioned previously, justified the need for an ‘objective’ 
reflection of the Eurodollar market. The cash-settled derivatives market, however, required a 
benchmark (in this case LIBOR). However, it is impossible to actually exchange LIBOR.  It 
is only possible to trade derivatives on it.  
                                                
7 FSA (2013) 
8 The covered interest parity states that interest rate differentials between two currencies should be perfectly 
reflected in the foreign exchange swap price - otherwise arbitrage would be possible. LIBOR tends to be used 
for to represent the corresponding interest rates.  
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LIBOR Takes Centre Stage: the Making of Derivatives Markets and the Eclipse of 
Eurodollars 
 
As seen above, banks made the Eurodollar market and subsequently made LIBOR. Faced 
with this and the regulatory situation that existed, banks went on to make LIBOR-indexed 
derivatives. They make these markets both by providing liquidity but also the infrastructure 
of the markets - from legal documentation to payment and settlement systems (Lindo 2013). 
One way in which this is made clear is by examining how the Bank for International 
Settlements measures the size of OTC derivative markets: the bank (comprising central banks 
and regulators) polls around 250 banks and asks them to whom and how much their OTC 
derivative exposure is. In other words, they make the strong assumption that all OTC 
derivatives have a bank as one of the counterparts. OTC derivatives are thus revealed as a 
banking instrument as much as loans and deposits are (with important differences as well of 
course). The corresponding figures for exchange-traded derivatives (ETD) are not available 
because at the end of every trading day the exchange steps between the original counterparts 
to each ETD so that they both end up facing the exchange, and are displayed this way in 
official statistics. Nevertheless, an examination of the governance, members and major 
participants on exchanges suggests banks play a similar role, i.e. as derivative market maker 
providing liquidity. Much the same has occurred with Central Counterparties (CCPs), which 
have grown in importance since 2008: banks have retained their market making (liquidity) 
role, but have passed responsibility for infrastructure provision to CCPs who end stepping 
between and facing both original counterparties to each transaction.  
As explained previously, cash-settled derivatives remove the need to source and 
deliver the underlying. This fundamental separation enables the derivatives market to expand 
beyond the limits of the underlying market. With regards to LIBOR, this process can be seen 
as having taken place through four phases - overlapping, but each strengthening the 
appearance that the benchmark represents a tradable market.  
 
The Growth of the LIBOR-Indexed Derivatives Market 
 
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange launched the world’s first cash-settled futures contract in 
1981, which quickly became the most actively traded short-term interest rate contract 
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globally (CME 2006). Since January 1997, it has been indexed to LIBOR yet still bearing the 
name Eurodollar future (perhaps reminding us of its roots). By 2011, the value of Eurodollar 
futures contracts reached 564 trillion U.S dollars, and by then several other competing 
exchanges (such as LIFFE and TIFFE) had offered similar contracts in other currencies.  
Despite the success story of exchange-traded LIBOR-based derivatives, it was the 
over-the-counter derivatives market that truly changed the market place. This was the largely 
unregulated market for bespoke interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives that mainly 
took place between banks: currency swaps, interest rate swaps, cross-currency basis swaps, 
forward rate agreements, swaptions and so on. Like the futures contracts, they started to 
appear in the early 1980s and, like exchange-traded futures contracts they too were mostly 
based on the LIBOR. Hence, similar benchmarks came to be ‘invented’ in other financial 
centres: HELIBOR in Helsinki, REIBOR in Reykjavik, TIBOR in Tokyo, STIBOR, NIBOR, 
CIBOR and so on. The Bank for International Settlements estimates that the interest rate 
swap market grew from having a daily turnover of 63 billion U.S. dollars in 1995 to 1.9 
trillion U.S. dollars in 2016 (BIS 1986, 2016b).  
Thus, although the Eurodollar market could be seen to have achieved deregulation 
and global market integration by the mid-1980s, it continued to play a crucial role by paving 
the way for the benchmark by which the vast majority of derivatives were been fixed and 
settled. As market volumes grew, market participants sought ever-greater legal certainty for 
existing contracts, citing systemic risk (should the contracts be deemed illegal). Greater legal 
certainty, however, only served to increase the amount of OTC-derivatives trading. 
Moreover, as explored above, the very nature of a derivative is a standardised instrument. 
The derivative is precisely not the specific particular exchange of a commodity or promise to 
pay for money, but is rather a transaction on the price for a standardised quantity and quality 
of the underlying. Consequently, as OTC volumes grew, contracts typically became 
increasingly standardised. 
 
The Growth of Banks’ LIBOR Exposure 
 
The second phase began to occur already during the 1980s, when the global economic 
situation and accompanying financial market regulatory changes transformed the character of 
the financial markets. Despite the Eurodollar market still growing, these changes led to a 
reduction in its relative importance as a funding source or investment outlet for the banks. 
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Instead, Eurodollars gradually turned into the prime tool to speculate on short-term interest 
rates in an increasing range of currencies. This was an area where banks, naturally, had a 
superior competitive, informational and economic advantage. As banks were able to take on 
more risk, the Eurodollar market was an ideal instrument for taking directional short-term 
interest rate risk. Further, the abolishment of capital controls made it possible for any bank to 
be involved in the Eurodollar market by constructing ‘synthetic’ Eurodollars through the 
covered interest parity. As foreign exchange swaps involved the simultaneous lending of one 
currency versus the borrowing of another with the same counterparty, they had the benefit of 
reducing credit risk, ultimately making them considerably more liquid than their underlying 
Eurocurrencies.  
As Camacho and Nieto (2009) argue, actual Eurodollars as a proportion of total credit 
creation began to diminish in the 1980s. However, LIBOR-derivatives, as a proportion of 
banks’ total exposure to LIBOR, increased and began to all but completely replace the 
Eurocurrency market as a vehicle for hedging, speculating and leveraging. In sum, 
derivatives enabled banks to expose themselves to LIBOR in large notional terms without 
little real or physical exposure to the underlying Eurodollar market.  
 
The Disappearance of the Underlying 
 
The third phase involved a gradual reduction, and even disappearance, of the underlying 
Eurodollar market. Similar to the development with regards to the foreign exchange swap 
market, the LIBOR derivatives market outgrew the Eurodollar market. The 1988 Basel 
Accord that was put in place focused on settlement and credit risk as bank assets were 
classified according to pre-set brackets ranging from zero to 100%, and banks were required 
to hold capital equal to 8% of the risk-weighted assets. However, whereas the Basel rules put 
new constraints on banks, they simultaneously opened doors. Excessive on-balance sheet 
asset usage (such as Eurodollar deposits) was penalised, at the same time as off-balance sheet 
product trading (e.g. LIBOR-derivatives) was rewarded.  
Whereas the more liquid (and less credit intense) foreign exchange market had 
managed to reduce some of the ‘necessities’ of the Eurocurrency market, the LIBOR 
derivatives market (which was even less credit intense) and new sources of funding (such as 
through securitisation) made the term money market all but unnecessary. This transformed 
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the ‘actual’ interbank money market more into a platform of rather ‘boring’ routine bank 
operations, rather than any ‘casino’.  
Maturities became, on balance, much shorter, as trading in-and-out was a highly 
capital intense activity. Trading in very short-term money market maturities (1-day, 1-week, 
etc.), however, had little to do with interest rate expectations and credit and more to do with 
daily funding and liquidity requirements to square up the bank balances. LIBOR, as a 
reflection of the term money market, therefore became even less linked to a market that was 
actually trading.  
Data from, for instance, the European Central Bank illustrates this phenomenon. As 
can be seen from Figure 1, the unsecured money market has shrunk dramatically since the 
advent of the financial crisis of 2007–08, whereas the foreign exchange swap market has 
grown. 
 
Figure 1: Cumulative quarterly turnover in the euro money market (millions) 
 
Sources: European Central Bank and authors’ calculations. Note: Second quarter every year. 
 
However, even though the traditional money market still ‘exists’, Figure 2 shows that 
the vast majority of unsecured lending is extremely short (less than one week). Rarely any 
trading takes place in 3-month or 6-month maturities, to which most LIBOR- or EURIBOR-
derivatives are indexed9.  
 
 
 
                                                
9 See Table 1 in FSB 2014 for the maturity concentration of LIBOR, EURIBOR and TIBOR.  
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Figure 2: Maturity breakdown of euro money market segments in 2015 (%) 
 
Sources: European Central Bank and authors’ calculations.  
 
 
The Eclipse 
 
The fourth, and perhaps most abstract, phase took place when the benchmark needed to 
become anchored to something else, most conveniently to its own derivative - rather than the 
underlying market it is supposed to reflect.  
The liquidity of LIBOR-derivatives increased as they became more suitable for 
trading ‘needs’ than the underlying Eurocurrencies were. Importantly, superior market 
liquidity gave them an advantage over the underlying asset (the term money market) in the 
price determination process. There are several ways to estimate and measure market liquidity. 
However, the most readily observable and by far most widely used proxy is the difference 
between the bid and offer price at any moment in time (the bid-offer spread). A tight bid-
offer spread indicates that a trading position can be turned around relatively cheaply. Figure 3 
illustrates this by depicting indicative bid-offer spreads for 3-month interbank deposits in 
Tokyo, London and New York, as well as 1X4 Japanese yen forward rate agreements 
(referencing 3-month Japanese yen LIBOR in 1 months time). As can be seen, using this 
price-based measure, the liquidity of the derivatives market surpassed that of the cash market 
years before the advent of the financial crisis of 2007–08. 
 
 
 
 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
Up to 1 week 1 week to 1 month 1 to 3 months  3 to 6 months 6 months to 1 year More than 1 year 
Unsecured deposits 
Foreign exchange swaps 
Forward rate agreements 
Overnight index swaps 
  
20 
Figure 3: Indicative Japanese yen bid-offer spreads 09.01.1997–16.02.2017 (basis points) 
 
Sources: Bloomberg and authors’ calculations. Notes: monthly 20-day moving averages. 
 
Hence, the LIBOR-rate for longer maturities (such as 6-months and 1-year) became 
less driven by actual Eurocurrency trading in those maturities, and instead reflected observed 
prevailing yield curves implied from the prices of a range of LIBOR-based derivatives (such 
as Eurodollar futures or forward rate agreements). Likewise, the underlying interest rates in 
the pricing of foreign exchange forward premia gradually started to lose their link to the real 
and physically tradable interest rate differential, and instead increasingly became functions 
using LIBOR-derivatives for specific currency pairs. Consequently, money market traders 
began more to look towards the LIBOR-indexed derivatives markets, rather than the money 
market itself, both in terms of risk-taking as well as for indications of the future direction of 
LIBOR. This trend appears to have consistently followed the growth of the LIBOR-based 
derivatives market. The separation between LIBOR-based derivatives and Eurodollar markets 
increased and LIBOR became increasingly self-referential.  
Thus, even though the notional amounts of LIBOR-based derivatives have increased 
dramatically during the recent decades, the relevance of the Eurodollar market moved in 
completely the opposite direction. Although the underlying (LIBOR) was never a market per 
se, its relative significance gradually increased. The astonishingly large turnover of 
derivatives referencing LIBOR sustained the illusion that the underlying index indeed 
reflected a large, liquid and efficient Eurodollar market. More specifically, it served as 
‘evidence’ that LIBOR was indeed an outcome of a market-determined (and hence objective) 
process. Perhaps a no better illustration of the faith in the LIBOR-equivalent benchmarks can 
be found than in EURIBOR, which was first published on 30 December 1998 – 2 days prior 
to the euro ex nihilo became legal tender on 1 January 1999. This enabled a EURIBOR 
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derivatives market to emerge before physical transactions possibly could be made, as the 
currency did not yet exist. 
 
LIBOR as an ‘objective fact’ 
 
In the previous sections, we demonstrated how the separation leads to a perception that 
LIBOR is a market-determined benchmark, even though the mechanism is no such thing. We 
also showed how, propelled by the sheer volume of derivatives trading, the underlying 
benchmark gradually takes on an objectivity that enables the derivatives market to eclipse the 
Eurodollar market. This enables LIBOR to replace the Eurodollar market as an objective fact. 
Together, these consequences allow LIBOR to cement itself as an objective fact far beyond 
the specialist derivatives market. 
First, it permits banks to put the benchmark into use in other areas of the economy. 
LIBOR becomes not only the benchmark of choice for a variety of derivatives contracts, but 
the underlying benchmark for seemingly unrelated agreements such as residential mortgages, 
credit card debt and student loans. The Eurodollar market was never an investment outlet or a 
place to raise funds for households or university students. However, having become directly 
exposed to the movement of the LIBOR rate through these agreements, it becomes a focal 
point that is easily followed in the daily press opting to publish it as any other important 
number, such as the local weather or the closing level of the stock market index.    
Second, given its importance in finance and economics, LIBOR also becomes 
frequently quoted (and misquoted as a ‘market in itself’) in scholarly and professional 
literature. The use of the derivatives benchmark, rather than the actual underlying market, in 
academic textbooks, journal articles and financial press further cements the facticity which 
had been developed through banks’ trading practices.  
However, the third and arguably most powerful justification for its use occurs when it 
becomes accepted and adopted by the state. The interbank money market rate is important in 
central banking as it acts as the ‘symbol’ of the first step of the monetary transmission 
mechanism, measuring how policy rate changes ultimately impact lending and borrowing in 
the real economy. LIBOR has not only increasingly replaced the actual market as this symbol 
- it has become a policy tool in itself. For instance, since January 2000, the Swiss National 
Bank uses a ‘target band’ for the 3-month Swiss Franc LIBOR as the central bank’s key 
monetary policy instrument (SNB 2015). As Stenfors (2014b) points out, the central bank of 
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Norway has gone a step further, by publicly announcing its projected monetary policy rate 
(the folio rate) and also the future 3-month Norwegian krone risk premia – based upon the 3-
month Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate (NIBOR). This might seem like a paradox, 
considering that the Eurodollar market was created in order to avoid the jurisdiction of the 
central banks. However, if the central bank, as an annex to the state, accepts the benchmark 
as ‘objective’, it becomes difficult to argue otherwise.  
As has been widely documented, the advent of the global financial crisis caused a 
complete freeze in the international interbank money markets. This, in itself, did not pose an 
immediate threat to the usage of LIBOR. On the contrary, the crisis catapulted the perception 
of the benchmark from something rather ‘boring’ into an important instrument for the 
financial system as a whole. The former British Bankers Association Chief Executive Angela 
Knight captured this in a speech on 18 December 2008: 
‘Since the credit crunch began, it has become clearer to all of us that LIBOR, not the 
Bank of England base rate, is what really governs saving and borrowing rates in the high 
street. It has always been relied on by the market as a reliable benchmark which is also the 
most transparent. It is appropriate in this global downturn to ensure the continued robustness 
of this pillar of our financial architecture.’ (BBA 2008) 
As money market risk premia surged in virtually all developed countries, central 
banks introduced a wide range of extraordinary measures to alleviate the stress in the banking 
systems. The common expression for this risk premium was the LIBOR-OIS10 spread, widely 
perceived to be based upon actual market transactions and thus objective (see, for instance, 
Bank of England 2007; McAndrews, Sarkar and Wang 2008; Soultanaeva and Strömqvist 
2009). Thus, LIBOR continued to be used not only when the interbank money market ceased 
to exist; it continued to be used even though ‘everyone knew’ the interbank money market no 
longer functioned. In fact, the absence of an underlying market did nothing to halt the growth 
of the derivatives market referring to it. As Figure 4 shows, the daily turnover in the global 
LIBOR-indexed forward rate agreement market was, in fact, boosted by the financial crisis of 
2007-08. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 The LIBOR-OIS spread has widely been used as a ‘barometer of fears of bank insolvency’ (Thornton 2009).  
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Figure 4: Global daily turnover of forward rate agreements (U.S. dollar millions) 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements. Note: April every year. 
 
 
Concluding Discussion 
 
In this paper, we asked how and why LIBOR became and remained such an important 
benchmark, and how it came to be perceived as an ‘objective fact’. In answering this 
question, we offer a fresh insight into the nature of LIBOR and, by extension, of financial 
benchmarks more generally. Tracing the historical emergence and development of LIBOR, 
we focus on its nature as a social construct which evolves and whose laws of motion can be 
discerned by showing how motivations and power to act establish practices, which transform 
the environment and with it the motivations and power of actors. Within this broad political 
economy framework, we draw upon the detailed observations of the social studies of finance 
and our cumulative experience of 25 years working in banks dealing with interest rate 
derivatives.  
We have stressed how banks make derivatives markets and explored how they make 
the thing to be traded – namely the underlying price index. We have shown how the 
construction of LIBOR, as the pre-eminent derivatives benchmark, allowed separation from 
the Eurodollar market from which it emerged. This separation allowed derivatives trading to 
take place – trading to capture price changes as if trading the underlying but without the 
necessity of having to do so. The resulting enormous quantity of trading established LIBOR 
as an objective fact – not only enabling it to eclipse the Eurodollar market serving as its 
template, but to become a ‘price’ in a number of markets and practices seemingly unrelated to 
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the Eurodollar market. LIBOR appeared as an objective price, which, importantly, served to 
delay the discovery that it was susceptible to manipulation (see Stenfors 2014b).  
Since the uncovering of widespread and systematic manipulation by LIBOR panel 
banks, the ‘LIBOR scandal’ has come to be portrayed as an extraordinary example of 
deception, manifested by the behaviour of a relatively small number of individuals during a 
few years of LIBOR’s lifetime. Such a depiction rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding 
of financial benchmarks in general, and LIBOR in particular. LIBOR was always susceptible 
to manipulation. Since its inception, the LIBOR mechanism was a fundamentally anti-
competitive process that benefitted from deception and secrecy. Moreover, by actively 
avoiding regulation and lobbying to maintain status quo, LIBOR panel banks could exercise 
significant power within this structure by ‘being able to gain by rewriting the rules of the 
game’ (Cohen 1977, 54-56). Most importantly, however, LIBOR benefitted by appearing as 
if it represented a competitive market generating a competitive ‘price’. Thus, along the lines 
of Lukes (1974), banks ultimately benefitted from shaping perceptions and preferences, 
which enabled a conflict with those affected by it to arise in the first place. Consequently, the 
LIBOR structure should not be seen as a self-created and self-governed platform where banks 
(or individuals working for these) were able to ‘cheat the system’. Rather, the practices, 
which the scandal revealed, should be seen as logical and consistent with the evolution of 
LIBOR.  
It could be argued that the reaction by policymakers and regulators to the LIBOR 
scandal poses a question of our analysis above as it sought to make the LIBOR fixing 
‘official’. This, however, only goes to confirm our logic. While separation from the 
underlying market is essential to allow as if trading, the underlying must still be regarded as 
trustworthy by the users. The reaction by regulators and policymakers following the scandal 
was precisely that: to seek to establish some kind of ‘correctness’ in the LIBOR process – 
particularly by targeting the behaviour of the LIBOR-banks (and individuals working for 
these), but also by trying to fine-tune what LIBOR ought to represent. Reforms brought 
‘formalisation and professionalism’ into the LIBOR-rate setting process (IBA 2014, 3). For 
instance, in the UK, the regulation and supervision of the benchmark were shifted from the 
bank lobby (the British Bankers Association) and the LIBOR-panel banks themselves to the 
financial regulator (the Financial Conduct Authority). Benchmark-manipulation was also 
made a criminal offence, and a specific Code of Conduct (‘the LIBOR Code’) set out practice 
standards that LIBOR panel banks were expected to follow. All in all, these set of measures 
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strived to eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, the incentives of LIBOR-manipulation by 
banks. Reforms were also aimed at making LIBOR more ‘market-like’. No change was made 
with regards to the definition of what the LIBOR was. Instead, a large number of currencies 
and maturities (where the underlying Eurocurrency market was negligible) were removed 
from the LIBOR fixing mechanism altogether (HM Treasury 2012). Furthermore, 
acknowledging that the underlying market for the remaining LIBORs might, at times, be 
illiquid or even non-existent, provisions were made allowing LIBOR-banks to use their 
‘expert judgement’ when submitting quotes during periods of ‘market turmoil and inactivity 
when inter-bank offers are absent’ (IBA 2014, 12). In this case, non-Eurocurrency markets 
were only allowed, but explicitly recommended, to form the basis for judgement. These other 
markets included foreign exchange swaps and derivatives markets such as overnight index 
swaps and interest rate futures (e.g. Eurodollar futures) and options (e.g. options on 
Eurodollar futures) – echoing our previous analysis regarding the ‘eclipse’ (IBA 2014, 23-
24). LIBOR was, in effect, supposed to be made ‘trustworthy’ for end-users.  
As Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003, 26) argue, ‘interest rates are not like conventional 
prices and the capital market is not like an auction market’. Prices and benchmarks related to 
borrowing and lending are ultimately dependent on trust and relationships. However, as 
MacKenzie (2007) claims, the benchmark also must retain an element of facticity. Because 
the only payments are between the derivative counterparties and are based upon the 
movements in the underlying benchmark, it needs to appear objective to both parties, e.g. it 
cannot be one over which one party can exert control.11 As long as the use was largely 
constrained to banks in the interbank interest rate swap market the informal rules of the 
previous LIBOR arrangements were sufficient. The circle of trust between the relatively few 
(LIBOR) banks could support such informal arrangements. However, once the use became 
more widespread these informal rules were insufficient. The financial crisis of 2007-08 came 
to act as a trigger to reveal the LIBOR scandal, and how the rules had come to lag behind the 
widespread use of the benchmark. Making the rules formal and seemingly separate from 
                                                
11 Lynch (2011) describes derivatives as aleatory contracts. An aleatory contract is a ‘contract in which one 
party’s duty of performance depends on some uncertain event, e.g. a wagering contract, a contract of insurance’ 
(Richards and Curzon 2011) or more simply as ‘a wagering  contract’ (Osborn and Woodley 2005). Lynch 
stresses that in derivatives and in aleatory contracts, duty of performance depends on an uncertain event external 
to the counterparts and not on their performance.  
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banks furthered established the ‘thing-like’ like character of the LIBOR as a price, and 
encouraged its further use. While this was conveyed by regulators and policymakers as 
making the market ‘safer’, it in no way challenged the use of LIBOR-derivatives or of 
LIBOR itself.  It only encouraged it.  
An alternative policy than reinforcing LIBOR’s facticity, LIBOR derivatives markets, 
and the spread of LIBOR throughout the economy did exist. Analysis has shown that markets 
and benchmarks are made, in this case by banks seeking profits in the circumstances 
transmitted from the past (and often made by themselves). If they could be made, then they 
could also be ‘un-made’. As acknowledged by the Financial Conduct Authority (2017), 
‘LIBOR [was] sustained by the use of “expert judgement” by the panel banks to form many 
of their submissions.’ The unmaking of LIBOR ultimately did not depend so much on the 
lack of trading activity in the underlying market, as in the erosion of power and trust in those 
making it. 
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